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Quebec’s Interculturalism Policy and the Contours of Implicit Institutional Discourse 
Samuel Shapiro 
University of Auckland (New Zealand) 
EASA 2012 (Université Paris X-Nanterre) 
 
Dining with Politicians: Quebec, France, and New France 
 
On the evening of 23 February 2009, Quebec sociologist and historian Gérard Bouchard, 
then the William Lyon Mackenzie King Visiting Professor of Canadian Studies at 
Harvard University, invited that province’s premier, Jean Charest, to speak on the topic 
of ‘Current and Future Priorities in Quebec for International Relations with the United 
States’.  Bouchard is the brother of one of Charest’s arch rivals during the 1990s, former 
Quebec premier Lucien Bouchard, who is best known for helping to lead a referendum 
campaign in 1995 which came within one percentage point of making Quebec a 
sovereign country from the rest of Canada. 
 
After Charest’s talk – which was attended by an audience of about one hundred people 
which included representatives of the Quebec Government Office in Boston and 
francophone public officials from American states that bordered on Quebec – I was 
invited to a small dinner of about a dozen people in an elegant private dining room on 
Harvard’s campus.  Charest and his wife, Michèle Dionne, discussed the controversy that 
erupted when he was named a commander of France’s Legion of Honour (Légion 
d’honneur) by France’s then-president, Nicolas Sarkozy, earlier that month on 2 
February.  Charest recounted how, during his speech on that occasion, Sarkozy explicitly 
mentioned that he was straying from his prepared remarks to call into question France’s 
long-standing diplomatic position of ‘non-interference, non-indifference’ toward 
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Quebec’s internal split between those who wish to separate from Canada (like Lucien and 
Gérard Bouchard, who belong to the Parti Québécois, henceforth PQ) and those who do 
not (such as Charest, who belong to the Quebec Liberal Party).  Smirking, Sarkozy called 
the ‘ni-ni policy’, as it is commonly referred to in France, as ‘not [his] thing’, sharply 
critiqued ‘sectarianism’, ‘defining one’s identity through fierce opposition to another’, 
‘division’ and ‘hatred’ during a time of ‘unprecedented [economic] crisis’.  He instead 
made a plea for the ‘universal values’ of La Francophonie in front of numerous senior 
officials from that organisation.  A smiling Charest accepted the award from Sarkozy on 
behalf of all Quebeckers who had sought to keep the French language and culture alive in 
Quebec since Quebec City was settled in 1608 by the French explorer Samuel de 
Champlain.  Despite this, he later told reporters that he thought France would have no 
option but to return to the ‘ni-ni’ policy in the event of another referendum on Quebec 
sovereignty, and explicitly refused to interpret Sarkozy’s speech any further.  At the 
Harvard dinner, Charest revealed his consternation at Sarkozy’s remarks, and noted that 
the first thing Dionne (his wife) said to him afterwards was ‘we’re going to be in the 
news tomorrow’. 
 
Sarkozy’s remarks were largely viewed in Quebec and Canada as a thinly-veiled critique 
of Quebec’s separatist movement, one of the province’s two major political forces whose 
an essentially bipartite system at the provincial level since the early-to-mid 1970s has 
centred around whether Quebec wishes or not to become a separate country from the rest 
of Canada.  Otherwise put, what is Quebec’s place as a francophone society in a Canada 
dominated by the English language and a North America dominated by Canada’s closest 
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neighbour and arguably the world’s largest superpower, the United States?  But I believe 
that this anecdote also reveals a second question that this first one has revealingly 
overshadowed.  Namely, what is Quebec’s relationship to Europe, including but not 
exclusively or its de facto mother country France (cf. Bouchard 2000)1? 
 
Student strikes and societal models 
 
Before I treat these questions in greater depth, let us fast forward to take another 
revealing example from the last few months.  Since mid-February 2012 to the present day 
(July 2012), Quebec’s university and CEGEP2 students have been hosting strikes and 
staging nightly marches down the streets of cities throughout Quebec with pots and pans.  
The strikes, nominally over the Charest government’s plan to increase tuition fees for 
tertiary education (which are still the lowest in Canada), have attracted international 
attention and many public figures and intellectuals have contributed to what has been 
called a larger ‘societal’ debate. 
 
The strikes have provoked rumours that Charest’s majority government may call early 
elections later this year, caused the now former vice premier and education minister to 
resign in early May, and caused the government to adopt a highly controversial bill 
(called Bill 78) on 18 May which restricted student rights to protest. Several rounds of 
negotiation between the government and the leaders of Quebec’s major three student 
                                                 
1
 For comparative examples, see Herzfeld 1987 on ancient and modern Greece, and 
Kapferer 1988 on Australia and the UK. 
2
 CEGEP covers grades (or years) 12 and 13 and is normally taken by most if not almost 
all Quebec students between secondary school (grades 7 to 11) and university. 
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organisations3 have produced no solution to date.  Several of these student groups are 
currently challenging Bill 78 before the courts, and the United Nations and Amnesty 
International have expressed doubts as to its efficacy and legality under Quebec’s and 
Canada’s international human rights obligations. 
 
What is arguably most revealing about the student strikes for my purposes here is how it 
has implicitly raised the desire on the part of sectors of these student groups to be closer 
to a welfare state model based on social protection, present in several Scandinavian 
countries and France, but not in the rest of Canada.  This theme, picked up by certain 
sectors of the Canadian press, is one that I argue that the consistent if necessary emphasis 
on defining Quebec as a francophone society within North America has helped obscure.  
I wish here to explore how Quebec is situated at the confluence of Anglo-Saxon and 
French political elites, and to ask broader questions about scales and levels.  In so doing, 
I ask broader anthropological questions about the state, nationalism and institutions 
through studying policy.  How is it, for example, that the Quebec premier can give a talk 
at a world-renowned university about Quebec’s ‘international relations’ with the United 
States without causing a diplomatic stir, how can Quebec sign a labour mobility 
agreement with France, and how have references such as Quebec ‘national’ parks and the 
National Assembly (Quebec’s provincial parliament) come to been seen as normal?  I 
shall do so through paying attention to how Quebec has tried since the 1970s to develop 
                                                 
3
 Namely, CLASSE (Coalition large de l’association pour une solidarité syndicale 
étudiante), the FEUQ (Fédération étudiante universitaire du Québec), and the FECQ 
(Fédération étudiante collégiale du Québec). 
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its own (implicit) policy for the management of ethnic and cultural diversity, commonly 
called interculturalism.   
 
The beneficiaries of confusion over defining Quebec interculturalism 
 
At this point, the obvious question arises: what is interculturalism?  However, fifty years 
of policy documents and a vast corpus of intellectual writing on the topic (cf. Labelle 
2008b) have created confusion about what interculturalism means in official and 
unofficial circumstances.  A recent research report conducted for a 2007-08 Quebec 
Royal Commission4 looking into cultural differences (Rocher et al 2007:49-52) identified 
four ‘defining features’ of state-level interculturalism which it claimed have remained 
constant since 1981: 1) recognition of diversity as one of Quebec’s essential 
characteristics, 2) French as the explicit language of public discourse and citizenship; 3) 
mutual respect for a common heritage, democracy and participation; and 4) an effort to 
eliminate discrimination.  However, these four principles sound very rhetorical and 
general, as well as ones that could or would apply to most Western democracies, with the 
possible exception of the importance of the French language. 
 
Therefore, instead of asking the question ‘what is interculturalism’, I propose to explore 
how interculturalism has come to stand for a wide variety of political projects over 
several decades.  In this way, I seek to ask ‘whose project is Quebec interculturalism?’  
                                                 
4
 The Commission, officially called the Consultation Commission on Accommodation 
Practices Related to Cultural Differences, was commonly known as the Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission, after its two co-chairs, the aforementioned Gérard Bouchard and political 
philosopher Charles Taylor. 
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Who does this confusion over the meaning of interculturalism serve, and whose interests 
does it benefit?  Is there more political mileage out of not defining interculturalism, and 
why?  I would like to suggest that interculturalism might fall under what Maurice 
Godelier (1984) calls ‘l’idéel’.  Godelier links the production of meaning to questions of 
representation, interpretation and legitimation, and defines the ‘idéel’ as a mental 
construct that refers to or only exists as an idea, in contrast to the ‘material’5.   
 
I argue that Quebec interculturalism is a revealing example of what Marc Abélès (1999) 
has called ‘institutional semantics’, by which he means the words that institutions use in 
the attempt to create a common institutional logic.  Like Abélès, I am interested in the 
‘the political and semantic conditions of the production’ of ‘institutional semantics’ and 
how their ‘usage, contribution, manipulation and re-appropriation … profoundly shape 
institutions and public discourse and are involved in their restructuring’ (ibid:509, 510)?  
Abélès crucially emphasizes that institutional semantics ‘constitute a kind of symbolic 
protection against the dangers that threaten us’, are profoundly affected by the dynamics 
of certain political contexts, can hide changes in meaning of the same word or expression 
over time and can ‘continue to be invoked as an essential reference, even though [their] 
content is becoming increasingly ambiguous’ because such concepts are ‘essentially 
polysemic, and this polysemy gives [them] even more power’ (ibid:503, 504).   
 
                                                 
5
 According to Godelier (1984:pt. 2), the ‘idéel’ part of social relations or reality refers to 
the conscious and unconscious ways in which people act upon principles, representations 
and rules in order to produce concrete social relations or organizations between 
individuals or groups.   
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According to this Royal Commission (Bouchard and Taylor 2008:116-18), there are four 
major ‘phases’ of interculturalism6:  
 
1. A movement to strengthen the French language in Quebec during the 1970s 
2. The PQ policy statement of 1981, which sought to eliminate discrimination 
against what it called the ‘cultural communities’ while maintaining the dominance 
of a French-language culture 
3. The 1990 policy statement under the Liberals, which sought to establish a ‘moral 
contract’ between Quebec and its immigrants, whose contributions to society 
were more overtly encouraged within a civic framework 
4. A socio-legal citizenship model adopted by the PQ shortly after the failure of the 
1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty, in an attempt to place less emphasis on 
the ethnic or cultural dimensions of belonging 
 
A strengthening of the French language (1960s-70s) 
 
At the same time as Quebec began to define itself through (the French) language and its 
geo-political boundaries in the 1960s and 1970s, its newly-founded (in 1968) Ministry of 
Immigration negotiated a series of accords with the Canadian federal government that 
gave it more power over immigration in 1968, 1971, and 1975 (see esp. Anctil 1996:141-
                                                 
6
 As mentioned above, a vast literature exists on Quebec interculturalism, despite a 
notable dearth in the anthropological literature on this topic.  For good overviews of 
Quebec’s intercultualism policy, see notably and especially Anctil 1996, Labelle 2008a, 
and McAndrew 2009. 
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46; Labelle 2008a; McAndrew 2009)7.  What is striking here is that, in acquiring the right 
over who comes into its borders as part of several ad hoc agreements with the Canadian 
federal government in a highly politicized climate, Quebec has one of the hallmarks of 
the powers of a sovereign state.  Yet, as sovereigntists – including but not limited to 
members and elected representatives of the Bloc and Parti Québécois – constantly remind 
us, Quebec is anything but a sovereign state, and does not have a formal, ‘special’ status 
within Canada.  What is most revealing here is that not only does Quebec define itself as 
a distinct political community and a ‘nation’ through its political rhetoric, in large part 
owing to its dissident policies and interpretation of Canadian federal policy, it has 
acquired a characteristic that few or no other non-sovereign entity in the world possesses. 
According to Quebec anthropologist Pierre Anctil, ‘after a long societal debate which 
coincided with the Quiet Revolution, the desire of the Quebec government to intervene in 
the domain of immigration arose at the exact moment when the linguistic question took 
centre stage in Montreal’ (1996:141).  After the two first federal-provincial accords in 
1971 and 1975, ‘the Quebec Ministry of Immigration was becoming a major actor in the 
valorization of the French language in Montreal’ (ibid:142).  In 1975, the Liberal 
provincial government concluded an accord with the federal government allowed Quebec 
to select the foreigners who would settle in the province based of the economic, 
demographic and socio-cultural needs and characteristics of the areas in which these 
immigrants planned to settle, as long as they respected the already established federal 
criteria in that domain (see, e.g., Anctil 1996:142; Bouchard and Taylor 2008:116).  And 
                                                 
7
 As Quebec anthropologist Marie-Claude Haince (2010:280-81) observes, this complex 
process takes place at several levels and among many actors, involving notably the 
federal and provincial governments, the immigrants themselves, and specialized 
immigration agencies. 
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two years later, Quebec’s controversial new language laws of 1977 – the Charter of the 
French Language, popularly known as Bill 101, passed by the pro-independence PQ – 
created an essentially monolingual society which imposed French as the language of 
education for all children without at least one parent educated in English in Canada and 
mandated French-only public signage (see, e.g., Anctil 1996:142, Bibeau 2002:221, 
227)8.   
A shift in emphasis: the PQ’s ‘culture of convergence’ (1980s) 
The next major phase in this process began in 1981, whereby the PQ adopted an Action 
Plan entitled ‘Quebecers Each and Every One’ (Quebec 1981), setting out a plan whereby 
the non-French ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘cultural communities’ (a term coined in this 
document which has since become part of the standard lexicon) had to adapt to Quebec 
society while strengthening a ‘culture of convergence’ around the French language, and 
Quebec’s status as the only majority francophone society in North America9.  This 
emphasis on the French language as a defining characteristic of the Quebec nation was an 
explicit effort to distinguish Quebec’s approach from Canadian multiculturalism and the 
                                                 
8
 To little surprise, Bill 101 has been the target of several court provisions since its 
passage, and several provisions of it have been struck down.  The law now notably allows 
public signage in languages other than French (i.e. English) if they were of a specified 
magnitude of font size smaller than in French, allows the use of English and French in the 
Quebec National Assembly.  However, issues about access to English-language public 
and private schooling and the age at which francophone children should begin learning 
English still spark political and societal controversy. For details, see, e.g. S. Das 2008; 
Larrivée 2003; Le Bouthillier 1998; Pagé and Georgeault 2006. 
9
 For details on the 1981 policy statement and the ‘culture of convergence’, see Anctil 
1996:142-144; Bibeau 2002:227-228; Bouchard and Taylor 2008:116-117; Handler 
1988:178-81; Juteau et al 1998:99-100; Labelle 2000:277-78, 2008a:24-29; McAndrew 
1995:41, 2009:212. 
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American melting pot10, although it may have presaged the Canadian multiculturalism by 
explicitly recognizing the right of ‘cultural communities’ to maintain their traditions as 
well as their contribution to the larger society (McAndrew 1995:41).  According to 
Bibeau (2002:226-230), 1981 marked a ‘territorial turn’ in Quebec’s policy focused on 
defining the province as a political territory, as distinct from the earlier ‘linguistic turn’ of 
the 1970s, and the later ‘civic turn’ in 1990 and ‘republican turn’ in 2000, all of which 
Bibeau conceives as part of the same ‘spiral’11.  The 1981 Action Plan accomplished two 
paradoxical processes at once.  On one hand, it defined the ‘Quebec nation’ as including 
native-born Quebecers of English and French descent as well as the indigenous peoples 
and excluding the so-called ‘cultural communities’ whose native language was neither 
English nor French, while defining these as relatively homogenous entities.   On the other 
hand, the government now made an explicit effort to include the cultural communities 
into Quebec society through teaching ‘heritage languages’, establishing radio stations, 
newspapers, and social clubs for these communities, and including them in public 
institutions such as schools, courts, hospitals, etc.12 
The Liberals’ ‘moral contract’ (early-to-mid 1990s) 
In 1990, the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa drafted a new statement on its 
immigration and integration policy, entitled ‘Let’s Build Quebec Together’ (Quebec 
1990), which instituted a ‘moral contract’ between the host society and newcomers, now 
                                                 
10
 See Bouchard and Taylor 2008:117; Labelle 2000:277-278, 2008b:43-44; Juteau et al 
1998:99. 
11
 See discussion of these latter two ‘turns’ below.  In a related vein, Labelle argues that 
the ethnic nation (a socially constructed ethno-cultural group) and the civil nation (a 
territorial identity linked to non-legal citizenship) are both present in Quebec nationalism 
and ‘indissociable from an historical perspective’ (2008a:41). 
12
 See, e.g., Bibeau 2002:228; S. Das 2011; Helly 1996:28-29, 299-309. 
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defined as full Quebecers instead of as exterior to the Quebec nation as in the 1981 
statement.  This document emphasized the contributions of Quebec’s non-francophone 
population, as well as insisting on reciprocity and mutual accommodation, as well as 
viewing cultural diversity as an explicit asset.  Furthermore, everyone would have to live 
according to the norms and practices of Quebec’s ‘common public culture’, notably the 
equality of the sexes, French as the common public language and of education, and 
adherence to democracy and the equality of all citizens, including Quebec’s English-
speaking and indigenous populations13.  The document explicitly stressed citizen 
participation in common institutions (see esp. Anctil 1996:144; Bouchard and Taylor 
2008:117), and the equality of all citizens in an explicitly pluralist society14.  It clearly 
laid out Quebec’s desire to select immigrants who ‘[would contribute] to the development 
of a francophone society and a striving economy, in keeping with Quebec values of 
family reunification and international solidarity, and a gradual increase in immigration 
levels according to the needs of the host society’, and sought to develop resources for 
learning and promoting the use of French, and ‘[develop] harmonious relations between 
Quebecers of all origins’ in order to ‘[increase] support for the openness of the host 
society and the full participation of immigrants and their offspring in Quebec’s economic, 
social, cultural, and institutional life’ (McAndrew 2009:208, 209).  McAndrew (ibid) 
                                                 
13
 For details on the 1990 policy statement, the ‘moral contract’, and ‘common public 
culture’, see Anctil 1996:144-145, 147-148; Bibeau 2002:228-229, 235; Bouchard and 
Taylor 2008:117; B. Gagnon 2006:131-137; Juteau 2002:444-445; Juteau et al 1998:99-
100; Labelle 2000:278, 284, 2008a:29-32; McAndrew 1995:39, 42-44, 2009:207-13; 
Satzewich and Liodakis 2007:137.  Significantly, according to Bibeau, this common 
public culture is ‘organized around … a group of values inherited from Judaeo-Christian 
traditions and Greek humanism’ (2002:235).  For a broader reflection on ‘common public 
culture’ in its various interactions, see the volume edited by Gervais et al (2008). 
14
 E.g. B. Gagnon 2006:133; Juteau et al 1998:99; McAndrew 2009:208-209. 
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highlights how the 1990 policy statement highlights the socioeconomic performance of 
immigrants and the limits of adaptation to pluralism, especially religious pluralism.  At 
the same time, many commentators on Quebec interculturalism15 have highlighted that 
immigration and cultural pluralism are intimately linked to Quebec’s affirmation as a 
distinct political or ‘national’ community, especially as it showed that Quebec was 
capable of establishing its own terms of belonging to a territorially-defined political 
community, and accommodate diversity within a society which consistently emphasized 
the precarious nature of its French-speaking majority. 
At the same time as the Bourassa (Liberal) government released this policy statement, the 
Progressive Conservative federal government of Brian Mulroney introduced a round of 
constitutional debates and negotiations – known as the Meech Lake and Charlettetown 
Accords, of 1990 and 1992, respectively – which sought to formally inscribe Quebec’s 
recognition as a ‘distinct society’, ability to select the immigrants who would settle in 
Quebec, and right to 25% of the seats in the federal House of Commons, among other 
provisions, in the Canadian Constitution of 198216.  In the words of Quebec political 
philosopher Charles Taylor, ‘[the] Meech [Lake Accord] was important because it was 
the first time that recognition of Canadian duality and the special role of Quebec was 
being written into a statement of what Canada was about’ or ‘a clear recognition that this 
                                                 
15
 See, among others, A. Gagnon and Iacovino 2002:325, 336, 2005:28, 39; B. Gagnon 
2006:138; Garcea 2006:14, 15; McAndrew 2009:214; Taylor 1991:60, 67. 
16
 For details on the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, see Anctil 1996:142; 
Bataille 1988:386; Bibeau 2002:233-234; A. Gagnon and Rocher 1997:55, 59; Labelle 
2000:271; Labelle and Rocher 2006: 148, 162; Rocher 2002: 88-90, 92; Sévigny 2008 
MA:56, 83; Taylor 1991:58-75.  Notably, the Meech Lake accord occurred in the same 
year as the Oka Crisis, the first of several constitutional crises over land with the First 
Nations (indigenous) peoples and the Canadian federal government during the 1990s and 
2000s (see Mackey 2002:110-14, 122-31 for details). 
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was part of our purpose as a federation’, which served as ‘a common reference point of 
identity, which can rally people from many diverse backgrounds and regions … as part of 
the indispensable common ground on which all Canadians ought to stand’ (1991:65, 58).  
The failure of both of these accords led to a rise in Quebec nationalist sentiment, shared 
by both Quebec federalists and sovereigntists, who insisted on Quebec’s status as a 
‘distinct society’ despite this perceived rejection by English-speaking Canada.  This 
culminated in the election of the PQ government led by Jacques Parizeau in 1994 and a 
referendum on Quebec sovereignty in 1995 that failed by about 1%.  Significantly, it also 
led to the creation in 1990 of Canada’s first ever sovereigntist party at the federal level, 
the Bloc Québécois, in the aftermath of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, which won 
a majority of seats in Quebec in every federal election from 1993 until 2011, and formed 
the federal Official Opposition – ironically still named Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition – 
from 1993 to 1997 despite only running candidates in one of Canada’s ten provinces.   
After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, the Canadian and Quebec 
governments concluded an accord in 1991 that gave Quebec greatly increased power over 
the selection and integration of immigrants17.  This accord, which has led to a mostly 
peaceful collaboration between the two levels of government (McAndrew 2009:207), 
must be situated in its immediate political context of the failure of the Meech Lake 
Accord and the Canadian government’s aforementioned continuing desire to assure 
national unity and counter the Quebec sovereigntist movement.  As a result of this 
accord, the Quebec government gained the exclusive power to select all immigrants who 
chose to freely settle in that province, while Canada retained exclusive power over family 
                                                 
17
 For details on the 1991 Canada-Quebec accord, see Anctil 1996:146, 2005:47, 49, 53; 
McAndrew 2009:206-207. 
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reunification and granting status to refugees and other humanitarian immigrants, as per 
the Geneva Convention (ibid:206).  Quebec gained control over the linguistic and 
economic integration of newcomers, emphasizing that Quebec is a francophone milieu, 
while Canada dealt with the obligatory medical exams and police reports after the 
Quebec government had already accepted immigrants, as well as promoting intercultural 
relations, encouraging societal participation, and establishing the criteria for and formally 
granting Canadian citizenship (ibid:206-207). 
 
A controversial attempt at Quebec citizenship (mid 1990s-early 2000s) 
 
Shortly after the razor-thin failure of the aforementioned 1995 referendum on Quebec 
sovereignty, the PQ government of Lucien Bouchard began to elaborate a more socio-
legal model of Quebec citizenship to replace the more civic model of the Liberals’ 1990 
policy statement18.  According to Labelle and Rocher (2004:272-280), the PQ tried to 
construct Quebec citizenship as a common civic contract or political community that 
linked citizenship and nationality based around a civic heritage shared by all Quebec 
citizens.  Quebec sociologist Danielle Juteau (2002) highlights how this Quebec 
citizenship emphasizes the need to share, defend and protect the French language against 
the joint threats of globalization and English-dominated North America and wanted to 
formalize a status that was criticized for being too slanted toward a homogenous national 
French-Canadian ideal that deleted ethnic differences from the ‘cultural communities’.  In 
                                                 
18
 For details of the PQ’s citizenship-based approach, see Bouchard and Taylor 2008:117; 
Juteau 2000:12-20, 2002:445-453; Labelle 2008a:32-35; Labelle and Rocher 2004:271-
80. 
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Juteau’s words, according to this new citizenship paradigm, ‘cultural diversity must 
express itself within a unified institutional system dominated by the Francophone 
majority (read French Canadians) ... and building a collective national identity was 
associated with the struggle against exclusion’ (ibid:448).   
 
An emphasis on discrimination and equality (2003-2012?) 
 
After their election in 2003 (and winning two subsequent re-elections until the present 
day), the current Liberal government of Jean Charest placed a greater emphasis on 
explicitly valuing diversity, and particularly the contributions of the ‘cultural 
communities’, as well as prominently combatting the discrimination, racism, and 
socioeconomic inequalities they faced19.  In these regards, the Charest government’s 
policies bore remarkably more resemblance to the previous Liberal government under 
Bourassa than the PQ citizenship approach. 
 
Concluding paradoxes and larger significances 
 
At the end of this review of Quebec interculturalism since the 1970s, what larger 
anthropological points can we draw out of this analysis?  We have certainly seen how a 
precarious balance exists between openness to diversity and protecting the distinctly 
francophone heritage and character of Quebec’s long-dominant majority population (or 
‘stock’, as it is often called).  This situation exists in large part because of Quebec’s 
                                                 
19
 See Bouchard and Taylor 2008:118; Garcea 2006:4-5; Labelle 2005:92; McAndrew 
2007:150. 
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consistent attempt since the 1960s to define itself through policy and as a ‘policy 
community’ (Shore and Wright 1997:15; 2011:11-12).  Interculturalism seems to be an 
apt example of how post-Quiet Revolution Quebec governments have come to believe in 
what Tess Lea (2008:15-20, 129-34, 151) calls ‘the magic of intervention’, whereby 
bureaucrats and institutions become determined to ‘fix’ problems through the solution of 
more governance (see also Bacchi 2009).  But the key and more general question here, I 
believe, is what are the historical and current dimensions of the political equation and the 
academic climates in which we work – the deep-seated assumptions too often uncritically 
taken for granted instead of problematized or scrutinized (Bacchi 2007, 2009, 2012) – 
that make us able to ask certain questions and unable or unwilling to challenge certain 
core conceptions or paradigms20. 
 
To return to the specific case study I have presented, the Quebec situation presents us 
with three simultaneous major paradoxes.  Firstly, post-1960s political elites have 
consistently attempted to define Quebec as a ‘policy community’ through its provincial-
level political institutions based around the territory of the province of Quebec and 
especially the French language.  The focus in these discussions has been on questions of 
jurisdiction and powers, whereby successive Quebec governments – whether 
sovereigntist or federalist – have sought more and more powers from the federal 
government.  However, just as these same politicians and elites are trying to situate 
Quebec as a distinctive political community, they simultaneously explicitly situate 
(francophone) Quebec as a minority within a North American framework, instead of a 
                                                 
20
 See also Božić-Vrbančić 2003; Fassin 2006, 2010; Neveu 2006, 2009; Povinelli 2002 
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majority within Quebec.  This implicit framing, while often not interrogated, has served 
to underline the spirit of the interculturalism policy as articulated by the provincial 
Liberals and the PQ for decades. 
 
I further suggest – and this is the second paradox – that Quebec’s continuing, perpetual 
and fraught attempt to situate itself within North America has made it so that Quebec’s 
ties to Europe in some areas (such as interculturalism) tend to be de-emphasized.  While 
Quebec’s ties to France in the cultural and linguistic domains are undeniable, 
interculturalism’s ties to French Republicanism have been denied, and much more 
emphasis has been spent differentiating it from Canadian multiculturalism and the 
American melting pot21.  This is one of the key issues that the current student strikes 
raise; namely, how does Quebec situate itself vis-à-vis both Europe and North America at 
the same time?  Indeed, interculturally speaking and otherwise, Quebec shares ties to the 
United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the rest of Canada, and seeing in detail 
how these connections coexist and play out is a crucial task for future research.  The 
underlying issue at hand here, then, is far from unique to Quebec, and could be fruitfully 
explored for other places in the world. 
 
                                                 
21
 A large literature exists on this topic, but the lack of discussion about the relationship 
between French Republicanism and Quebec interculturalism may be just as revealing as 
the attempts to distinguish the latter from Canadian multiculturalism and the American 
melting pot.  See, for one recent and revealing example, Bouchard 2011:404, 411, 413, 
427n50, 430.  I discuss some of this at greater length in a forthcoming article under the 
auspices of the British Association of Canadian Studies.  For a revealing comparative 
example on the French case, see Neveu 2009 and references therein. 
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Thirdly, the student strikes help bring to the fore Quebec’s welfare state arrangement 
based on social protection, which differentiates it markedly from the rest of Canada.  
Quebec’s comparatively higher provincial sales taxes provides numerous social services 
such as more inclusive health care, lower tuition fees, state-funded child care, but also 
has led to greater state intervention in other domains, such as its oft-criticized language 
laws and liquor control boards.  The student strikes are a vivid reminder of the fact that 
certain segments of Quebec’s population want the provincial government to provide 
greater levels of social protection, namely lower tuition rates.  Along with the current re-
framing of the political landscape caused by the crushing defeat of the pro-sovereignty 
Bloc Québécois in the May 2011 Canadian federal elections, some in Quebec are asking 
out loud if the province is moving toward a left/right division co-existing with or even 
replacing the federalist/sovereigntist divide which has dominated provincial politics since 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
I conclude by offering three larger take-away points.  Firstly, we have to simultaneously 
look at several scales in order to understand the state (see also Abélès 1996, Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002; Herzfeld 2005; Randeria 2007).  In the Quebec case, in order to understand 
how Quebec tries to operate as a ‘state-like’ actor (cf. Scott 1998), we have to scrutinise 
at least four levels, and look at what happens at each level and the interactions and 
complex influences between them: 
• Regional diversity within Quebec (including a well-ingrained but infrequently 
challenged dichotomy between urban, diverse Montreal and the ‘regions’ 
which constitute the white, French, homogenous ‘rest’ of Quebec) 
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• Quebec’s place within Canada 
• Quebec’s place within North America 
• Quebec’s relationship with Europe (including but not limited to France) 
 
Secondly, we must be attentive to how forms of government impact questions of political 
culture.  For Quebec, the model of asymmetrical federalism (e.g. Burgess 2001; Gagnon 
and Iacovino 2007; Requejo 1998:esp. 49-83) has made it so that Quebec governments, 
pro- as well as anti-independence (sovereigntist vs. federalist), have continued to ask for 
greater voice on the international stage.  Examples have abounded on the Canadian 
political scene in the last few years.  To cite only two examples, the federal Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper has tried to court the Quebec nationalist vote since its rise 
to power in February 2006 by giving the province a permanent representative in the 
Canadian delegation at UNESCO.  And, in October 2008, the Charest provincial 
government signed a labour mobility agreement with France that attempted to simplify 
the recognition of professional qualifications, especially those for practising a regulated 
profession or trade, and thus make it easier to work in the other jurisdiction.  At the same 
time, Quebec has continued to demand greater powers and jurisdiction within Canada.  
As we have seen, Quebec has acquired several of the hallmarks of a sovereign state, 
namely quasi-total control over immigration flows into its territory, without being a 
sovereign state, or without one of its two largest political parties asking for any sort of 
special status.   By a series of similar de facto, case-by-case accords with the federal 
government, Quebec has also developed its own revenue agency, language laws, health 
care system, pension system, etc.  Quebec statehood, then, exists both within Canada, 
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below the level of Canada, and on the international stage.  Analysing any one or two of 
these levels without the others would leave us with an incomplete portrayal of the 
situation at hand. 
 
Thirdly and lastly, we must interrogate the implicit assumptions underlying policies and 
political cultures.  In Quebec, the politicking about statehood and a desire to affirm 
Quebec as a ‘nation’ under different guises (sovereigntist and federalist) has resulted in 
some important but revealing lacunae.  Something as banal as Quebec ‘national’ parks, or 
the region around Quebec City being officially called the ‘Capitale nationale’, serve as 
two of many revealing examples in this regard.  In Quebec’s essentially bipartite political 
system since the 1970s, oppositions between the two main parties (the sovereigntist PQ 
and the federalist Liberals) and a common desire to assert Quebec as a distinct political 
community has meant that a lot of positions that could cause disagreement go unsaid.  
The fact that interculturalism – and associated terms such as ‘common public culture’, 
‘cultural communities’, and others – have existed as common unifying terms despite their 
changes in meaning (cf. Abélès 1999) has served to mask the disagreements over two 
vastly different visions for Quebec’s political status.  This serves to underscore the 
usefulness of the flexibility of a term such as ‘interculturalism’ and how the hesitancy to 
define the term allows it to serve as a rallying cry for Quebec’s difference allows one to 
stay at the level of the ‘idéel’ (Godelier 1984) instead of the material or concrete.  As 
Quebec ethnic relations and education scholar Marie McAndrew has revealingly written, 
‘although the existence of a dichotomic opposition between [interculturalism and 
multiculturalism] is still an article of faith widely shared by politicians and public opinion 
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in Quebec, in part because it is closely linked to the very definition of Quebec’s distinct 
identity, when one focuses on actual programmes and practices, instead of political 
rhetoric, it is clear that Canadian multiculturalism and Quebec interculturalism have 
much in common’ (2009:204).   
 
Therefore, instead of trying to establish a model of Quebec interculturalism’s distinctive 
traits, perhaps a more revealing angle on questions of the state, institutions and 
governance would be to try track how the term interculturalism has been used to refer to 
different representations and practices in particular historical and present-day conjectures.  
This would then allow us to work backwards (Bacchi 2009:3) from programs and 
practices and recognise the ‘alternative discourses’ that make ‘cultural change … forever 
emergent in performance’ (Herzfeld 2005: 54, 66).  In so doing, we should dare to 
critically question the underlying premises that underlie, and examine the individuals, 
groups, and political actors who benefit from the changing, if not confusing, contours of 
Quebec’s implicit institutional discourse.    
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